Hitchcock's (2001) treatment of singular and general causation

Minds and Machines 16 (3):277-287 (2006)
Hitchcock (2001a) argues that the distinction between singular and general causation conflates the two distinctions ‘actual causation vs. causal tendencies’ and ‘wide vs. narrow causation’. Based on a recent regularity account of causation I will show that Hitchcock’s introduction of the two distinctions is an unnecessary multiplication of causal concepts.
Keywords Causal claims  General causation  Philosophy of science  Regularity theory  Singular causation
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-006-9039-x
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1967). Causal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
P. Dowe (2001). A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):216 – 226.
Christopher Hitchcock (2003). Of Humean Bondage. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1):1-25.

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