Blaming Mindreaders: Intentional Action, Moral Responsibility, and Theory of Mind

Abstract

Two prominent views of the role of intentional action ascriptions are the “theory of mind” view, which holds that the primary function of intentional action ascriptions is their use in behavior explanation and prediction, and the “evaluative” view, which holds that the primary function of intentional action ascriptions is their use in evaluating moral considerations. Within the evaluative view, there are two models: a “simultaneous” model in which ascriptions of intentional action and moral responsibility are sub-processes of a general behavior evaluation process, and a “blame-first” model in which ascriptions of moral responsibility are made prior to ascriptions of intentional action, and can influence ascriptions of intentional action. Surveys by Joshua Knobe and Thomas Nadelhoffer have demonstrated that the presence of moral considerations makes people more likely to attribute intentional action than they would in parallel cases without moral considerations, providing support for the evaluative view. However, current explanations of the influence of moral considerations on ascriptions of intentional action are unsatisfactory. An account is proposed synthesizing the theory of mind view and the blame-first model of the evaluative view into an integrated theory of intentional action, moral responsibility, and theory of mind. Ascriptions of moral responsibility are made by recognizing and attributing desires to others, and originate with an earlier developing desire-based theory of mind system. Ascriptions of intentional action are made by building hypothetical models of others’ beliefs, and originate with a later developing belief-based theory of mind system

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