|Abstract||This paper seeks to deflate G. A. Cohen’s recent meta-ethical argument that fundamental principles must be “fact-insensitive.” That argument does not advance Cohen’s dispute with Rawls and other social contract theorists. There is attenuated sense of “factinsensitivity” which they can happily grant, which Cohen never rules out on specifically metaethical grounds. While his barrage of substantive (non-meta-ethical) arguments may retain independent force, the argument from fact-insensitivity is largely (though not entirely) inconsequential.|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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