David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 54 (4):384-397 (2011)
Abstract Everyday inanimate things such as stones, teapots and bicycles are not objects to which moral agents could have direct duties; they do not have moral status. It is usually assumed that there is therefore no reason to think that a morally good person would, on account of her goodness, be disposed to treat them well for their own sakes. I challenge this assumption. I begin by showing that to act for the sake of an entity need not be to suppose that it has moral status, but simply to regard it as an end in itself. Having done this, I argue that it is not, as is conventionally assumed, implausible to suppose that to be morally good is to be disposed to treat at least some inanimate things gently, and to do so, moreover, for the sake of those things, rather than for some other reason
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References found in this work BETA
Paul W. Taylor (2011). Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton University Press.
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Christine Swanton (2003). Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Clarendon Press.
Jean-Paul Sartre (1956). Being and Nothingness. Distributed by Random House.
Mary Anne Warren (1997). Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Clarendon Press.
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