Metaphilosophy 36 (3):272-294 (2005)
|Abstract||This article argues that we can and should recognize the mind dependence, epistemic dependence, and social dependence of theories of mind-independent reality, as opposed to Rorty, who thinks not even a constructivist theory of mind-independent reality can be had. It accuses Rorty of creating an equivocation or "dualism of scheme and content" between causation and justification based on various "Davidsonian" irrelevancies, not to be confused with the actual Davidson. These include the 'principle of charity', the attack against conceptual schemes, the linguistification of social practice, intersubjectivism, and causal naturalism. It follows that realists and constructivists need neither follow Rorty's mischaracterizations nor succumb to his internal paradoxes|
|Keywords||constructivism Richard Rorty. constructionism realism|
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