David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):161 - 177 (2008)
According to John McDowell,<span class='Hi'></span> representational perceptual content is conceptual through and through.<span class='Hi'></span> This paper criticizes this view by claiming that there is a certain kind of representational and non-conceptual perceptual content that is sensitive to bodily skills.<span class='Hi'></span> After a brief introduction to McDowell's position,<span class='Hi'></span> Merleau-Ponty's notion of body schema and Gibson's notion of affordance are presented.<span class='Hi'></span> It is argued that affordances are constitutive of representational perceptual content,<span class='Hi'></span> and that at least some affordances,<span class='Hi'></span> the so-called <span class='Hi'></span>'conditional affordances'<span class='Hi'></span>, are essentially related to the body schema.<span class='Hi'></span> This means that the perceptual content depends upon the nature of the body schema.<span class='Hi'></span> Since the body schema does not pertain to the domain that our conceptual faculties operate upon,<span class='Hi'></span> it is argued that this kind of perceptual content cannot be conceptual.<span class='Hi'></span> At least some of that content is representational,<span class='Hi'></span> yet it cannot feature as non-demonstrative conceptual content.<span class='Hi'></span> It is argued that if it features as demonstrative conceptual content,<span class='Hi'></span> it has to be captured by private concepts.<span class='Hi'></span> Since McDowell's theory does not allow for the existence of a private language,<span class='Hi'></span> it is concluded that at least some representational perceptual content is non-conceptual.
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References found in this work BETA
Jan Almäng (2007). Intentionality and Intersubjectivity. Göteborgs Universitet.
Adrian Cussins (2003). Postscript: Experience, Thought, and Activity (2002). In York H. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Mit Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Shaun Gallagher (1995). Body Schema and Intentionality. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Mit Press. 225--244.
Melvyn Goodale & David Milner (2013/2005). Sight Unseen: An Exploration of Conscious and Unconscious Vision. Oup Oxford.
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