David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):165-166 (2003)
This comment makes four related points. First, explaining coordination is different from explaining cooperation. Second, solving the coordination problem is more important for the theory of games than solving the cooperation problem. Third, a version of the Principle of Coordination can be rationalized on individualistic grounds. Finally, psychological game theory should consider how players perceive their gaming situation.
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