David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia Mathematica 18 (2):193-226 (2010)
There is an apparent tension between the open-ended aspect of the ordinal sequence and the assumption that the set-theoretical universe is fully determinate. This tension is already present in Cantor, who stressed the incompletable character of the transfinite number sequence in Grundlagen and avowed the definiteness of the totality of sets and numbers in subsequent philosophical publications and in correspondence. The tension is particularly discernible in his late distinction between sets and inconsistent multiplicities. I discuss Cantor’s contrasting views, and I conclude that his account of that distinction is only tenable if the definiteness of the set-theoretical universe is rejected
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References found in this work BETA
Joseph W. Dauben (1977). Georg Cantor and Pope Leo XIII: Mathematics, Theology, and the Infinite. Journal of the History of Ideas 38 (1):85-108.
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