Knowledge versus Understanding: The Cost of Avoiding Gettier

Acta Analytica 27 (2):183-197 (2012)
Abstract
In the current discussion on epistemic value, several philosophers argue that understanding enjoys higher epistemological significance and epistemic value than knowledge—the epistemic state the epistemological tradition has been preoccupied with. By noting a tension between the necessary conditions for understanding in the perhaps most prominent of these philosophers, Jonathan Kvanvig, this paper disputes the higher epistemological relevance of understanding. At the end, on the basis of the results of the previous sections, some alternative comparative contrasts between knowledge and understanding are briefly explored, including one in which an analogue to the KK-principle for knowledge, the “UU-principle”, does not hold for a different reason than that for which the former principle fails.
Keywords Understanding  Knowledge  Gettier  Factivity  Kvanvig
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    References found in this work BETA
    M. DePaul (2009). Does an Ugly Analysis Entail That the Target of the Analysis Lacks Value? In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 112--38.
    Catherine Elgin (2009). ``Is Understanding Factive?&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 322--30.

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