David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 27 (2):183-197 (2012)
In the current discussion on epistemic value, several philosophers argue that understanding enjoys higher epistemological significance and epistemic value than knowledge—the epistemic state the epistemological tradition has been preoccupied with. By noting a tension between the necessary conditions for understanding in the perhaps most prominent of these philosophers, Jonathan Kvanvig, this paper disputes the higher epistemological relevance of understanding. At the end, on the basis of the results of the previous sections, some alternative comparative contrasts between knowledge and understanding are briefly explored, including one in which an analogue to the KK-principle for knowledge, the “UU-principle”, does not hold for a different reason than that for which the former principle fails.
|Keywords||Understanding Knowledge Gettier Factivity Kvanvig|
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References found in this work BETA
William Alston (2005). Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
William P. Alston (1985). Concepts of Epistemic Justification. The Monist 68 (1):57-89.
M. DePaul (2009). Does an Ugly Analysis Entail That the Target of the Analysis Lacks Value? In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 112--38.
Michael R. Depaul & Stephen R. Grimm (2007). Review Essay on Jonathan Kvanvig's the Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):498–514.
Catherine Elgin (2009). ``Is Understanding Factive?&Quot. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 322--30.
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