David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theory and Decision 50 (2):119-148 (2001)
Focal points seem to be important in helping players coordinate their strategies in coordination problems. Game theory lacks, however, a formal theory of focal points. This paper proposes a theory of focal points that is based on individual rationality considerations. The two principles upon which the theory rest are the Principle of Insufficient Reason (IR) and a Principle of Individual Team Member Rationality. The way IR is modelled combines the classic notion of description symmetry and a new notion of pay-off symmetry, which yields different predictions in a variety of games. The theory can explain why people do better than pure randomization in matching games
|Keywords||Game theory Focal points Individual considerations|
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Robert Sugden (2003). The Logic of Team Reasoning. Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):165 – 181.
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David L. Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt (2010). Nonbinding Recommendations: The Relative Effects of Focal Points Versus Uncertainty Reduction on Bargaining Outcomes. [REVIEW] Theory and Decision 69 (4):615-634.
Hykel Hosni & Jeff Paris (2005). Rationality as Conformity. Synthese 144 (2):249 - 285.
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