Materialism
Philosophy Research Archives 1459:457-497 (1982)
| Abstract | The following paper will attempt (i) to set forth a form of materialism that is ‘Spinozistic’ in maintaining that there is a conceptual, but not an ontological distinction between mental and physical phenomena; (ii) to undermine objections to this based on (a) ‘functionalism’ and (b) the conception of (and identity conditions for) an event that has been advocated by Goldman, Brandt, and Kim; and (iii) to explain why, according to the identity ‘theory’, the apparent failure of the indiscernibility of identicals is merely apparent | |||||||||
| Keywords | Functionalism Identity Theory Materialism Metaphysics Spinoza | |||||||||
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W. E. Cooper (1977). Beyond Materialism and Back Again. Dialogue 16 (June-July):191-206.
Stephen J. Noren (1970). Identity, Materialism, and the Problem of the Danglers. Metaphilosophy 4 (October):318-44.
Christopher S. Hill (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.
John Haugeland (1984). Ontological Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1):1-12.
Harry Howard (1999). If Not Functionalism, Then What? Eliminative Materialism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):955-956.
L. J. Eshelman (1977). Functionalism, Sensations, and Materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (June):255-74.
Emmett L. Holman (1986). Maxwell and Materialism. Synthese 66 (March):505-14.
P. S. Kitcher (1982). Two Versions of the Identity Theory. Erkenntnis 17 (March):213-28.
Charles F. Donovan (1978). Eliminative Materialism Reconsidered. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (June):289-303.
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