Philosophy Research Archives 1459:457-497 (1982)
The following paper will attempt (i) to set forth a form of materialism that is ‘Spinozistic’ in maintaining that there is a conceptual, but not an ontological distinction between mental and physical phenomena; (ii) to undermine objections to this based on (a) ‘functionalism’ and (b) the conception of (and identity conditions for) an event that has been advocated by Goldman, Brandt, and Kim; and (iii) to explain why, according to the identity ‘theory’, the apparent failure of the indiscernibility of identicals is merely apparent
Keywords Functionalism  Identity Theory  Materialism  Metaphysics  Spinoza
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DOI 10.5840/pra198289
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