David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25 (2012)
More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these norms are not problematic in the way critics have suggested they would be. In particular, these norms do not guide thinking by motivating intentional agents to (intentionally) accord with them; as a result, no obvious vicious regress threatens the theory. In the final section of this paper, I argue that accepting this teleological theory of intentionality need not commit one to thinking that intentionality is the product of natural selection
|Keywords||Intentionality Mental content Normativity Teleology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
J. L. Austin (1950). Truth. Aristotelian Society Supp 24 (1):111--29.
Mark Bedau (1990). Against Mentalism in Teleology. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):61 - 70.
Mark Bedau (1991). Can Biological Teleology Be Naturalized? Journal of Philosophy 88 (11):647-655.
Mark Bedau (1992). Where's the Good in Teleology? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):781-806.
Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Manuel García-Carpintero (2012). Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts. Philosophy Compass 7 (6):410-421.
Jonathan Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2012). Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology. Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.
Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Book Symposium:Truth as One and Many. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):105-114.
Similar books and articles
Michael Gorman (2003). Subjectivism About Normativity and the Normativity of Intentional States. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):5-14.
Jennifer M. Morton (2011). Toward an Ecological Theory of the Norms of Practical Deliberation. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):561-584.
Frank Dignum (1999). Autonomous Agents with Norms. Artificial Intelligence and Law 7 (1):69-79.
B. Verbeek (2002). Game Theory and Moral Norms. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):337-352.
Ryan Burg (2009). Deliberative Business Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 88 (4):665 - 683.
Peter Suber (1989). The Reflexivity of Change: The Case of Language Norms. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3 (2):100 - 129.
Sven Ove Hansson (2001). The Structure of Values and Norms. Cambridge University Press.
Kristin Andrews (2009). Understanding Norms Without a Theory of Mind. Inquiry 52 (5):433-448.
Pascal Engel (2002). The Norms of Thought: Are They Social? Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148.
Onora O'Neill (2007). Normativity and Practical Judgement. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):393-405.
C. Bicchieri (2010). Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
Mason Cash (2008). Thoughts and Oughts. Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):93 – 119.
Stephen Jacobson (1997). Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms. Synthese 110 (3):343-355.
Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey (2010). Social Norms and the Traditional Deterrence Game. Synthese 176 (1):105 - 123.
Added to index2010-10-25
Total downloads163 ( #4,828 of 1,100,108 )
Recent downloads (6 months)34 ( #4,581 of 1,100,108 )
How can I increase my downloads?