Performance, promotion and information

Journal of Business Ethics 50 (2):187-198 (2004)
If a firm provides incentives by promoting those who have performed well in a job, it may transfer them to a job to which they are not well suited and agents are promoted to their levels of incompetence. Tournaments are an alternative to reputation as a means of ensuring that firms reward good performance when performance is unverifiable.
Keywords Philosophy   Ethics   Business Education   Economic Growth   Management
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:BUSI.0000022124.95071.0c
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,904
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Sara A. Morris (2005). Corporate Social Performance in Family Firms. Proceedings of the International Association for Business and Society 16:154-159.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

3 ( #462,240 of 1,725,443 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #268,753 of 1,725,443 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.