Attentional bias toward low-intensity stimuli: An explanation for the intensity dissociation between reaction time and temporal order judgment?
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):435-456 (2000)
If two stimuli need different times to be processed, this difference should in principle be reflected both by response times (RT) and by judgments of their temporal order (TOJ). However, several dissociations have been reported between RT and TOJ, e.g., RT is more affected than TOJ when stimulus intensity decreases. One account for these dissociations is to assume differences in the allocation of attention induced by the two tasks. To test this hypothesis, different distributions of attention were induced in the present study between two stimulus positions (above and below fixation). Only bright stimuli appeared in one position and either bright or dim stimuli in the other. In the two RT experiments, participants had to respond to every stimulus appearing in one of the two positions. Reaction times to bright stimuli were faster when they appeared in the position where dim stimuli were likely to occur. This finding suggests that the allocation of attention was adapted to the asymmetrical arrangement of stimuli, not suggested by explicit instruction. In the two TOJ experiments, the temporal order of stimuli appearing in the two positions had to be judged. Although bright stimuli appearing at the bright-and-dim location were judged to be earlier, this effect was small and insignificant. Further, the intensity dissociation between RT and TOJ was insensitive to random vs blockwise presentations of intensities, therefore was not modified by attentional preferences. Thus, asymmetrical arrangement of stimuli has an impact on the allocation of attention, but only in the RT task. Therefore dissociations between TOJ and response times cannot be accounted for by an attentional bias in the TOJ task but probably by different use of temporal information in the two tasks.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
David J. Murray (1999). A “Presence/Absence Hypothesis” Concerning Hippocampal Function. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):462-463.
Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov & Damir D. Dzhafarov (2010). Sorites Without Vagueness I: Classificatory Sorites. Theoria 76 (1):4-24.
A. Cowey, P. Stoerig & C. Le Mare (1998). Effects of Unseen Stimuli on Reaction Times to Seen Stimuli in Monkeys with Blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):312-323.
Joan Marie McMahon & Robert J. Harvey (2007). The Effect of Moral Intensity on Ethical Judgment. Journal of Business Ethics 72 (4):335 - 357.
Randall K. Campbell (1991). Nonnomic Properties of Stimuli and Psychological Explanation. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):77 - 92.
Bruce Bridgeman (1997). Attention Shuts Out Irrelevant Stimuli. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (4):769-769.
Paul Azzopardi & Alan Cowey (1998). Blindsight and Visual Awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):292-311.
R. Duncan Luce (2003). Increasing Increment Generalizations of Rank-Dependent Theories. Theory and Decision 55 (2):87-146.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #372,332 of 1,139,993 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #157,514 of 1,139,993 )
How can I increase my downloads?