Character, reliability and virtue epistemology

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212 (2006)
Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and (...) challenges for any reliabilist epistemology.
Keywords character, ETHICS, intellectual virtue, knowledge, RELIABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, VIRTUE epistemology
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.00437.x
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References found in this work BETA
Guy Axtell (1997). ``Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology". American Philosophical Quarterly 34:1--27.
Lorraine Code (1984). Toward a 'Responsibilist' Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):29-50.

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Citations of this work BETA
Heather Battaly (2008). Virtue Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):639-663.
Christopher Lepock (2011). Unifying the Intellectual Virtues. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):106-128.

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