Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212 (2006)
|Abstract||Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and (...) challenges for any reliabilist epistemology.|
|Keywords||character, ETHICS, intellectual virtue, knowledge, RELIABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, VIRTUE epistemology|
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