David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 80:209-224 (2006)
Descartes developed a compelling characterization of mental and physical phenomena which has remained more or less canonical for Western philosophy ever since. The greatest testament to the power of Cartesian thinking is its ubiquity. Even philosophers who are critical of post-Cartesian anthropology (philosophers,for instance, who are self-professed exponents of one or another form of hylomorphism) nevertheless tacitly endorse Cartesian assumptions. Part of what leads to this strange inconsistency is that by and large philosophers no longer know what a non-Cartesian anthropology looks like. I discuss some commitments characteristic of post-Cartesian philosophy of mind, and present an alternative conception of psychological phenomena more consistent with a hylomorphic framework
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Katalin Farkas (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.
James L. Marsh (1988). Post-Cartesian Meditations: An Essay in Dialectical Phenomenology. Fordham University Press.
Gregg Caruso (2005). Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption. In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press
John A. Foster (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.
Christopher Gilbert (2005). Catholic Cartesian Dualism. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):233-249.
Avner Cohen (1984). Descartes, Consciousness and Depersonalization: Viewing the History of Philosophy From a Strausian Perspective. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 9 (1):7-28.
Andrea Christofidou (2009). Self and Self-Consciousness: Aristotelian Ontology and Cartesian Duality. Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):134-162.
William Jaworski (2005). Hylomorphism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:201-216.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #57,401 of 1,725,580 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #64,887 of 1,725,580 )
How can I increase my downloads?