David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:178-192 (2004)
The dualist-materialist dichotomy can be understood in terms of an apparently inconsistent triad of claims: materialism, mental realism, and antireductionism.At one time, functionalism seemed capable of resolving the apparent inconsistency, but recent work in the philosophy of mind suggests it cannot. Functionalism’sfailure invites exploration into alternative strategies for resolution, one of which is suggested by Aristotle’s hylomorphism. The latter rejects PostulationalRealism, a semantic model for psychological discourse endorsed by regnant forms of dualism and materialism, as well as by functionalism. Several considerations indicate that Postulational Realism is an implausible model for psychological discourse at best, and therefore suggest its rejection might pave the way to resolving the dualist-materialist dichotomy in the manner of hylomorphism
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