David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 166 (1):133 - 155 (2009)
Philosophers and scientists are concerned with the why and the how of things. Questions like the following are so much grist for the philosopher’s and scientist’s mill: How can we be free and yet live in a deterministic universe?, How do neural processes give rise to conscious experience?, Why does conscious experience accompany certain physiological events at all?, How is a three-dimensional perception of depth generated by a pair of two-dimensional retinal images?. Since Belnap and Steel’s pioneering work on the logic of questions, Van Fraassen has managed to apply their approach in constructing an account of the logic of why-questions. Comparatively little, by contrast, has been written on the logic of how-questions despite the apparent centrality of questions such as How is it possible for us to be both free and determined? to philosophical enterprise.1 In what follows I develop a logic for how-questions of various sorts including how-questions of cognitive resolution, how-questions of manner, how-questions of method, of means, and of mechanism.
|Keywords||Explanation Questions Determinable Determinate Goldman Bennett Kim Van Fraassen Belnap Steel Why How Erotetic logic Manner Means Method Mechanism Possibility Logic Functional analysis Event|
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References found in this work BETA
Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1970). A Theory of Human Action. Princeton University Press.
Stephen Yablo (1992). Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Carl Gustav Hempel (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation. In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Free Press 504.
Citations of this work BETA
Benjamin Schnieder (2008). 'By': A Refutation of the Anscombe Thesis. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (6):649 - 669.
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