The psychology of dynamic probability judgment: order effect, normative theories, and experimental methodology
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Society 6 (1):53-66 (2007)
The Bayesian model is used in psychology as the reference for the study of dynamic probability judgment. The main limit induced by this model is that it confines the study of revision of degrees of belief to the sole situations of revision in which the universe is static (revising situations). However, it may happen that individuals have to revise their degrees of belief when the message they learn specifies a change of direction in the universe, which is considered as changing with time (updating situations). We analyze the main results of the experimental literature with regard to elementary qualitative properties of these two situations of revision. First, the order effect phenomenon is confronted with the commutative property. Second, an apparent new phenomenon is presented: the redundancy effect that is confronted with the idempotence property. Finally, results obtained in this kind of experimental situations are reinterpreted in the light of pragmatic analysis
|Keywords||dynamic probability judgment - Bayesian coherence - Revising - Updating -linguistic pragmatics - order effect|
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References found in this work BETA
Judea Pearl (2000). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge University Press.
D. Sperber & D. Wilson (1995). Relevance. Blackwell.
F. P. Ramsey (2010). Truth and Probability. In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge 52-94.
Glenn Shafer (1976). A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Jean Baratgin (2015). Rationality, the Bayesian Standpoint, and the Monty-Hall Problem. Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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