Abstract

According to linguistic relativism, we acquire knowledge about the world through language and thus the use of different languages results in different visions of the world. This view is sometimes supported by a statement saying that some of those visions are mutually inconsistent and they cannot be accepted simultaneously: the use of one of them is inconsistent with the use of the other. The paper discusses this statement referring to an example of languages of two logical calculi, and shows it to be an overstatement. Theses of different languages are not inconsistent, for they are based on different concepts. Concepts, needed for negating theses expressed in either language, cannot be found in the other one. The paper therefore poses a question whether it is possible to compile conceptual apparatuses of languages which are believed to be incommensurable. It concludes that in fact there are no logical obstacles. Such languages can be used together without the risk of cognitive conflict. However, it can be difficult due to pragmatic reasons. Although this would not undermine the beliefs of people using the broadened language, it could undermine some of their values and attitudes. This way broadening of the cognitive perspective by compiling conceptual apparatuses of different languages is likely to weaken those attitudes towards reality, from which the languages in question originated