Well-Being and Value

Utilitas 4 (01):1- (1992)
Something can be said to be good for a particular person , whether or not it is good for anyone else, let alone good ‘overall’ or ‘good simpliciter ’. Sometimes we speak of ‘John's good’ as well as of things that are ‘good for John’. What is ‘good for John’ is whatever enhances his ‘good’ or, to use an apparently synonymous term, his ‘well-being’. But what is a person's well-being: in what does it consist?
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Joseph Mendola (2006). Intuitive Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):441 - 477.
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