Philosophical Studies 132 (3):525 - 551 (2007)
|Abstract||I argue that Fitch’s ‘paradox of knowability’ presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist’s commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal apparatus for discussing the recognizability of states of affairs is offered, and other prima facie similar approaches to the paradox argument are reviewed.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Elia Zardini, If Every True Proposition is Knowable, Then Every Believed (Decidable) Proposition is True, or the Incompleteness of the Intuitionistic Solution to the Paradox of Knowability.
Janet Folina (1995). Putnam, Realism and Truth. Synthese 103 (2):141--52.
Christopher Read Hitchcock (1992). Causal Explanation and Scientific Realism. Erkenntnis 37 (2):151 - 178.
Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2005). Antirealism, Theism and the Conditional Fallacy. Noûs 39 (1):123–139.
Robert G. Hudson (2009). Faint-Hearted Anti-Realism and Knowability. Philosophia 37 (3).
Salvatore Florio & Julien Murzi (2009). The Paradox of Idealization. Analysis 69 (3):461-469.
Rafał Palczewski (2007). Distributed Knowability and Fitch's Paradox. Studia Logica 86 (3):455--478.
Bernhard Weiss (2007). Truth and the Enigma of Knowability. Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
William Child (2007). Dreaming, Calculating, Thinking: Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism About the Past. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):252–272.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads25 ( #49,501 of 548,973 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,438 of 548,973 )
How can I increase my downloads?