Entitlement and rationality

Synthese 157 (1):25 - 45 (2007)
Abstract
This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.
Keywords Entitlement  Epistemology  Epistemic Rationality
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References found in this work BETA
Hartry Field (2000). 1. The Concept of Apriority. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. 117.
Pamela Hieronymi (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.

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Citations of this work BETA
Martin Smith (2013). Entitlement and Evidence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.

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