Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge

Oup Oxford (2008)
Abstract
Carrie Jenkins presents a new account of arithmetical knowledge, which manages to respect three key intuitions: a priorism, mind-independence realism, and empiricism. Jenkins argues that arithmetic can be known through the examination of empirically grounded concepts, non-accidentally accurate representations of the mind-independent world
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $15.99 new (81% off)   $40.00 used (52% off)   $63.38 direct from Amazon (23% off)    Amazon page
ISBN(s) 9780199231577
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,008
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

View all 11 citations

Similar books and articles
C. S. Jenkins (2005). Knowledge of Arithmetic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):727-747.
Nenad Miščević (2005). Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):289-315.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tom Stoneham (1999). Boghossian on Empty Natural Kind Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):119-22.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-01-31

Total downloads

15 ( #154,315 of 1,696,562 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #79,846 of 1,696,562 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.