Graduate studies at Western
OUP Oxford (2008)
|Abstract||Grounding Concepts tackles the issue of arithmetical knowledge, developing a new position which respects three intuitions which have appeared impossible to satisfy simultaneously: a priorism, mind-independence realism, and empiricism. Drawing on a wide range of philosophical influences, but avoiding unnecessary technicality, a view is developed whereby arithmetic can be known through the examination of empirically grounded concepts. These are concepts which, owing to their relationship to sensory input, are non-accidentally accurate representations of the mind-independent world. Examination of such concepts is an armchair activity, but enables us to recover information which has been encoded in the way our concepts represent. Emphasis on the key role of the senses in securing this coding relationship means that the view respects empiricism, but without undermining the mind-independence of arithmetic or the fact that it is knowable by means of a special armchair method called conceptual examination. A wealth of related issues are covered during the course of the book, including definitions of realism, conditions on knowledge, the problems with extant empiricist approaches to the a priori, mathematical explanation, mathematical indispensability, pragmatism, conventionalism, empiricist criteria for meaningfulness, epistemic externalism and foundationalism. The discussion encompasses themes from the work of Locke, Kant, Ayer, Wittgenstein, Quine, McDowell, Field, Peacocke, Boghossian, and many others.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$43.00 used (47% off) $49.00 new (39% off) $62.22 direct from Amazon (23% off) Amazon page|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
C. S. Jenkins (2005). Knowledge of Arithmetic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):727-747.
Gábor Forrai (2011). Grounding Concepts: The Problem of Composition. Philosophia 39 (4):721-731.
James Robert Brown & James Davies (2011). Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge – C.S. Jenkins. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):208-211.
Jeffrey W. Roland (2010). Concept Grounding and Knowledge of Set Theory. Philosophia 38 (1):179-193.
Michael Potter (2007). What is the Problem of Mathematical Knowledge? In Michael Potter, Mary Leng & Alexander Paseau (eds.), Mathematical Knowledge.
John MacFarlane (2002). Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism. Philosophical Review 111 (1):25-65.
Derek Ball (2009). There Are No Phenomenal Concepts. Mind 118 (472):935-962.
Nenad Miščević (2005). Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):289-315.
Nenad Miščević (2008). Can Concepts Ground Apriori Knowledge? Peacocke's Referential Turn and its Challenges. Acta Analytica 23 (3):233-256.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tom Stoneham (1999). Boghossian on Empty Natural Kind Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):119-22.
Barbara C. Malt (2010). Why We Should Do Without Concepts. Mind and Language 25 (5):622-633.
Pavel Materna (2012). Mathematical and Empirical Concepts. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor.
John MacFarlane (2008). McDowell's Kantianism. Theoria 70 (2-3):250-265.
Added to index2012-01-31
Total downloads4 ( #189,469 of 740,452 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,957 of 740,452 )
How can I increase my downloads?