Motor intentionality and the case of Schneider

I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
Keywords Merleau-Ponty  motor intentionality  Hubert Dreyfus  John McDowell  Sean Kelly
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-009-9122-x
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References found in this work BETA
John Mcdowell (2007). What Myth? Inquiry 50 (4):338 – 351.
John McDowell (2007). Response to Dreyfus. Inquiry 50 (4):366 – 370.

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Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.

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