David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Investigations 29 (3):250–274 (2006)
Many naturalistically-minded philosophers want to accomplish a naturalistic reduction of normative (e.g. moral and epistemic) claims. Mindful of avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, such philosophers claim that they are not reducing moral and epistemic concepts or definitions. Rather, they are only reducing the extension of these normative terms, while admitting that the concepts possess a normative content that cannot be naturalistically reduced. But these philosophers run into a serious problem. I will argue that normative claims possess two dimensions of normativity. I will further argue that certain of the reductionist’s commitments require that these two dimensions of normativity be given a naturalistic reduction, while the other of the reductionist’s commitments make such a reduction impossible. Thus, the reductionist’s commitments both require and forbid a reductionist account of morality and epistemology. Thus, as we will see, reductionism is torn between two incompatible requirements, and must fail.
|Keywords||naturalism ethics epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
A. Rosenberg (1999). Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminative Materialists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):335-358.
Ian Slater (2000). Normative Naturalism and Popperian Views on Reduction. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):325 – 326.
Ellen R. Klein (1992). Is 'Normative Naturalism' an Oxymoron? Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):287 – 297.
Elisabeth Pacherie (2002). Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):299-317.
Larry Laudan (1990). Normative Naturalism. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):44-59.
John F. Post (2006). Naturalism, Reduction and Normativity: Pressing From Below. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):1–27.
Jeremy Randel Koons (2000). Do Normative Facts Need to Explain? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35 - 49.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
M. Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #56,532 of 1,088,810 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #42,743 of 1,088,810 )
How can I increase my downloads?