David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Papers 36 (3):343-370 (2007)
In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare’s (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their inter-relationships. Most importantly, it will show that it is unlikely that there is a single unique disease-concept at issue. Rather, different authors are, for the most part, considering different concepts.
|Keywords||Disease naturalism normativism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
C. Boorse, D. Van De Veer & T. Regan (1987). Health Care Ethics: An Introduction. In Donald VanDeVeer & Tom Regan (eds.), Health Care Ethics: An Introduction. Temple Univ. Press.
Christopher Boorse (1997). A Rebuttal on Health. In James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder (eds.), What is Disease? Humana Press. 1--134.
Christopher Boorse (1977). Health as a Theoretical Concept. Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
Christopher Boorse (1976). What a Theory of Mental Health Should Be. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 6 (1):61–84.
Christopher Boorse (1976). Wright on Functions. Philosophical Review 85 (1):70-86.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Juha Räikkä (1996). The Social Concept of Disease. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 17 (4).
Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss (2009). Against Content Normativity. Mind 118 (469):31-70.
Bjørn Hofmann (2001). Complexity of the Concept of Disease as Shown Through Rival Theoretical Frameworks. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (3):211-236.
Thomas Schramme (2007). The Significance of the Concept of Disease for Justice in Health Care. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (2):121-135.
Maksymilian Del Mar (2010). Normativism, Anti-Normativism and Humanist Pragmatism. Human Studies 33 (2):305-323.
P. Thagard (1996). The Concept of Disease: Structure and Change. Philosophical Explorations 29:445-478.
Robert D.'Amico (1995). Is Disease a Natural Kind? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20 (5):551-569.
George J. Agich (1983). Disease and Value: A Rejection of the Value-Neutrality Thesis. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 4 (1).
Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh (2000). Fuzzy Health, Illness, and Disease. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25 (5):605 – 638.
Germund Hesslow (1993). Do We Need a Concept of Disease? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 14 (1).
Philip Hefner (2004). The Necessity for a Theology of Disease: Reflections on Totalities and Fragments. Zygon 39 (2):487-496.
William E. Stempsey (2000). A Pathological View of Disease. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (4):321-330.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads25 ( #75,728 of 1,140,266 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #86,093 of 1,140,266 )
How can I increase my downloads?