Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 (2):488 - 514 (2005)
|Abstract||Natural deduction systems with indefinite and definite descriptions (ε-terms and ι-terms) are presented, and interpreted in Martin-Löf's intensional type theory. The interpretations are formalizations of ideas which are implicit in the literature of constructive mathematics: if we have proved that an element with a certain property exists, we speak of 'the element such that the property holds' and refer by that phrase to the element constructed in the existence proof. In particular, we deviate from the practice of interpreting descriptions by contextual definitions|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Edward N. Zalta (1988). A Comparison of Two Intensional Logics. Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (1):59-89.
Reinhard Muskens (2007). Intensional Models for the Theory of Types. Journal of Symbolic Logic 72 (1):98-118.
Berit Brogaard (2010). Descriptions: An Annotated Bibliography. Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.
B. H. Slater (1991). The Epsilon Calculus and its Applications. Grazer Philosophische Studien 41:175-205.
Stephen Schiffer (2005). Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions. Mind 114 (456):1135-1183.
Berit Brogaard (2007). Sharvy's Theory of Definite Descriptions Revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):160–180.
Paul C. Gilmore (2001). An Intensional Type Theory: Motivation and Cut-Elimination. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1):383-400.
Claire Ortiz Hill (2004). Reference and Paradox. Synthese 138 (2):207 - 232.
Stephen F. Barker (1982). Intensionality and Intentionality. Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
Paul Elbourne (2010). The Existence Entailments of Definite Descriptions. Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (1):1-10.
Philipp Koralus (2013). Descriptions, Ambiguity, and Representationalist Theories of Interpretation. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):275-290.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads8 ( #132,193 of 757,546 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #38,592 of 757,546 )
How can I increase my downloads?