Predication and extensionalization

Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):479 - 499 (2008)
In his 2000 book Logical Properties Colin McGinn argues that predicates denote properties rather than sets or individuals. I support the thesis, but show that it is vulnerable to a type-incongruity objection, if properties are (modelled as) functions, unless a device for extensionalizing properties is added. Alternatively, properties may be construed as primitive intensional entities, as in George Bealer. However, I object to Bealer’s construal of predication as a primitive operation inputting two primitive entities and outputting a third primitive entity. Instead I recommend we follow Pavel Tichý in construing both predication and extensionalization as instances of the primitive operation of functional application.
Keywords C. McGinn  extensionalization  functional application  G. Bealer  P. Tichý  possible-world semantics  predication  simple type theory  transparent intensional logic
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DOI 10.2307/41217849
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George Bealer (1993). A Solution to Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.

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