David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 7 (9):620-630 (2012)
Logical semantics includes once again structured meanings in its repertoire. The leading idea is that semantic and syntactic structure are more or less isomorphic. A key motive for reintroducing sensitivity to semantic structure is to obtain fine‐grained meanings, which are individuated more finely than in possible‐world semantics, namely up to necessary equivalence. Just getting the truth‐conditions right is deemed insufficient for a full semantic analysis of sentences. This paper surveys some of the most recent contributions to the program of structured meaning, while providing historical background. I suggest that to make substantial advances the program needs to solve the problem of propositional unity and develop an intensional mereology of abstract objects
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References found in this work BETA
Jeffrey C. King (2007). The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford University Press.
Peter M. Simons (1987/2000). Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Scott Soames (2012). What is Meaning? Princeton University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1947/1956). Meaning and Necessity. University of Chicago Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Marie Duží & Bjørn Jespersen (2015). Introduction. Synthese 192 (3):525-534.
Bjørn Jespersen & Marie Duží (2015). Transparent Quantification Into Hyperintensional Objectual Attitudes. Synthese 192 (3):635-677.
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