Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity

Philosophy Compass 7 (9):620-630 (2012)
Logical semantics includes once again structured meanings in its repertoire. The leading idea is that semantic and syntactic structure are more or less isomorphic. A key motive for reintroducing sensitivity to semantic structure is to obtain fine‐grained meanings, which are individuated more finely than in possible‐world semantics, namely up to necessary equivalence. Just getting the truth‐conditions right is deemed insufficient for a full semantic analysis of sentences. This paper surveys some of the most recent contributions to the program of structured meaning, while providing historical background. I suggest that to make substantial advances the program needs to solve the problem of propositional unity and develop an intensional mereology of abstract objects
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00509.x
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Scott Soames (2012). What is Meaning? Princeton University Press.

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Stuart Dalton (1998). Unity and Undecidability. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (4):25-32.
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Stephen R. Schiffer (1972). Meaning. Oxford,Clarendon Press.

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