The identity of indiscernibles and the co-location problem

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):163–176 (2006)
The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that there cannot be two individual things in nature that are qualitatively identical. The principle is not exactly popular. Michael Della Rocca tries to resurrect it by arguing that we must accept this principle, for otherwise we cannot explain the impossibility of completely overlapping indiscernible objects of the same kind that share all their parts and exist in the same place at the same time. I try to show that his argument goes wrong: we need not embrace the identity of indiscernibles to deal with the co-location problem.
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