David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness is often rendered causally and functionally inert, something which I deem deeply wrong. The actual cause of this misconception is not Cartesian, but Frege’an Dualism which is owed to the implicit assumption of the type-identity theory of language and cognition which equates cognitive types with linguistic or quasi-linguistic types by isomorphically mapping linguistic types on cognitive types and which is a massive blow in the face of a functionalistic-mechanistic explanation of cognition and everyday-folk phenomenological analysis. If we conceive paradigmatically of conscious (e.g. conceptual) thought linguistically and if we conceive of unconscious (e.g. conceptual) cognition linguistically too, then consciousness, particularly if phenomenal experience is conceived of the way it standardly is by philosophers, is inert. However, this type-identity theory is deeply flawed and I propose a framework which builds on a phenomenology of particularly visual-spatial consciousness, a generic embodied cognition framework and a mechanistic and principle naturalist framework of explanation. As a result, we will encounter a picture of cognition which is strongly bound to consciousness and a complex and dynamic sensori-emotio-motor view of the format of cognition which is able to deal more satisfactorily with a plethora of phenomena which we deem genuinely online and offline cognitive than the linguistic view.
|Keywords||Embodied Cognition Consciousness Enactivism Neurophenomenology Embodiment Representation Concepts Phenomenal Intentionality Sensorimotor Cognition Mechanistic Explanation|
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