Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem

Theoria 77 (3):201-213 (2011)
Abstract
Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the future. I argue that this proposal confronts significant internal problems and implicitly invokes higher-level epistemic conditions that run against the spirit of externalism
Keywords swamping problem  A. Goldman  value of knowledge  E. Olsson  value problem  reliabilism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Jason Baehr (2009). Is There a Value Problem? In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press. 42--59.
    Michael S. Brady (2006). Appropriate Attitudes and the Value Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):91 - 99.

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    Similar books and articles
    Linda Zagzebski (2000). From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:173-179.
    Alvin Goldman, Reliabilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Frank Hofmann (2013). Three Kinds of Reliabilism. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.
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