Reliability and Future True Belief: Reply to Olsson and Jönsson

Theoria 77 (3):223-237 (2011)
Abstract
In “Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem” I argue that Erik Olsson and Alvin Goldman's conditional probability solution to the value problem in epistemology is unsuccessful and that it makes significant internalist concessions. In “Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs” Olsson and Martin Jönsson try to show that my argument does “not in the end reduce the plausibility” of Olsson and Goldman's account. Here I argue that, while Olsson and Jönsson clarify and amend the conditional probability approach in a number of helpful ways, my case against it remains intact. I conclude with a constructive proposal as to how their account may be steered in a more promising direction
Keywords swamping problem  value problem  reliabilism  conditional probability solution  value of knowledge
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    Erik J. Olsson (2011). The Value of Knowledge. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.
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    Branden Fitelson (2002). Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):539 - 563.
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