Reliability and Future True Belief: Reply to Olsson and Jönsson

Theoria 77 (3):223-237 (2011)
In “Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem” I argue that Erik Olsson and Alvin Goldman's conditional probability solution to the value problem in epistemology is unsuccessful and that it makes significant internalist concessions. In “Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs” Olsson and Martin Jönsson try to show that my argument does “not in the end reduce the plausibility” of Olsson and Goldman's account. Here I argue that, while Olsson and Jönsson clarify and amend the conditional probability approach in a number of helpful ways, my case against it remains intact. I conclude with a constructive proposal as to how their account may be steered in a more promising direction
Keywords swamping problem  value problem  reliabilism  conditional probability solution  value of knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01104.x
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson (2009). ``Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 19--41.

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Citations of this work BETA
Erik J. Olsson (2011). The Value of Knowledge. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):874-883.

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Branden Fitelson (2002). Too Odd (Not) to Be True? A Reply to Olsson. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):539 - 563.

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