Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):44-70 (2006)
|Abstract||Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference is a defense and reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting theses that the self is peculiarly elusive and that our basic, cogito-judgments are certain. On the one hand, Descartes seems to be correct that nothing is more certain than basic statements of self-knowledge, such as "I am thinking." On the other hand, there is the compelling Humean observation that when we introspect, nothing is found except for various "impressions." The problem, then, is that the Humean and Cartesian insights are both initially appealing, yet they appear to be in tension with one another. In this paper I attempt to satisfy both intuitions by developing a roughly descriptivist account of self-reference according to which our certainty in basic beliefs stems precisely from our needing to know so little in order to have them|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Anne Newstead (2004). Self-Conscious Self-Reference: An Approach Based on Agent's Knowledge (DPhil Manuscript). Dissertation, Oxford University
Quassim Cassam (1996). Self-Reference, Self-Knowledge and the Problem of Misconception. European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):276-295.
Kent Bach (2006). What Does It Take To Refer? In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
Arthur E. Falk (1995). Consciousness and Self-Reference. Erkenntnis 43 (2):151-80.
Corine Besson (2009). Logical Knowledge and Gettier Cases. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):1-19.
Sydney Shoemaker (1968). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
Austen Clark (2006). Attention & Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness for the Pacific APA Meeting, Pasadena, California, 2004. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.
Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2008). Self-Knowledge: Rationalism Vs. Empiricism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.
John Campbell (web). Consciousness and Reference. In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Christopher Peacocke (2004). Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure. Mind and Language 19 (1):85-98.
Lucy O'Brien (2007). Self-Knowing Agents. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2012-03-18
Total downloads4 ( #189,403 of 739,189 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,778 of 739,189 )
How can I increase my downloads?