What kind of knowledge does a weak-willed person have?: A comparative study of Aristotle and the ch'eng-Chu school
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy East and West 50 (2):242-253 (2000)
This comparative study argues that both Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School deny that a weak-willed person truly and clearly knows what is best at the time of action, but their analyses of a weak-willed person's knowledge are rather different. It is shown that both Aristotle and the Ch'eng-Chu School believe that practical knowledge presupposes repeatedly acting on it and thus that the defect of the weak-willed person's knowledge cannot be overcome by purely cognitive training
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Jeremy Tanner (2009). Ancient Greece, Early China: Sino-Hellenic Studies and Comparative Approaches to the Classical World. A Review Article. Journal of Hellenic Studies 129:89-.
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