David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The debate concerning the proper way of understanding, and hence solving, the “is-ought problem” produced two mutually exclusive positions. One position claims that it is entirely impossible to deduce an imperative statement from a set of factual statements. The other position holds a contrary view to the effect that one can naturally derive an imperative statement from a set of factual statements under certain conditions. Although these two positions have opposing views concerning the problem, it should be evident that they both accept that the “is-ought problem” is concerned with the deducibility of imperative statements from factual statements. Later I will argue that this should not be our concern when we try to make sense of the way we reason about morality.
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