David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 52 (3):357-389 (1985)
The aim of this paper is to develop an adequate version of the D-N theory of explanation for particular events and to show how the resulting D-N model can be used as a tool in articulating a regularity theory of causation and an analysis of the truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals. Starting with a basic model that is largely the product of other workers in this field, two new restrictions are formulated in order to construct a version of D-N explanation that does not yield the counterintuitive results that have plagued all earlier versions. An additional condition is then developed that is indispensable for utilizing the D-N model as a tool in formulating a regularity theory of causation. Finally, it is shown how a suitable model of potential D-N explanation facilitates the formulation of a theory of counterfactual conditionals
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Del Ratzsch (1988). Explanation, Subjunctives and Statistical Theories. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1):80-96.
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