David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 71 (2):290-293 (2011)
One argument for the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem rests on direct inference from objective probabilities. In this paper, I consider a particularly clear version of this argument by John Pollock and his colleagues (The Oscar Seminar 2008). I argue that such a direct inference is defeated by the fact that Beauty has an equally good reason to conclude on the basis of direct inference that the probability of heads is 1/2. Hence, neither thirders nor halfers can find direct support in an appeal to objective probabilities.
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References found in this work BETA
Adam Elga (2000). Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 60 (2):143–147.
Jacob Ross (2010). Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas. Philosophical Review 119 (4):411 - 447.
Oscar Seminar (2008). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis 68 (2):149-155.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
Paul D. Thorn (2012). Two Problems of Direct Inference. Erkenntnis 76 (3):299-318.
Kai Draper (2013). The Evidential Relevance of Self-Locating Information. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):185-202.
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Paul D. Thorn (2011). Undercutting Defeat Via Reference Properties of Differing Arity: A Reply to Pust. Analysis 71 (4):662-667.
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