A Case of affirming the consequent in international law: un security council resolution 232 (1966)—southern rhodesia
History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2):201-210 (1994)
| Abstract | In this note I examine a case of teleological reasoning in international law and find it to be the fallacy of affirming the consequent.I then show that and how the basis of this fallacy is a manipulation (or juxtaposition) of ?necessary? and ?sufficient? conditions.I conclude by giving reasons for thinking that this kind of reasoning is a regular feature of international law | |||||||||
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