Online research in philosophy

Part one: Acquiring critical thinking skills -- Out of the fog : the pathway to critical thinking -- Nuts and bolts : the basics of argument -- Analysis : the heart of critical thinking -- Handling claims, drawing inferences -- The logic machine : deductive and inductive reasoning -- Part two: Sharpening the tools -- The persuasive power of analogies -- Fallacies, fallacies : steering clear of argumentative quicksand -- Roll the dice : causal and statistical reasoning -- Syllogisms -- Patterns of deductive reasoning: rules of inference -- Part three: Going out into the world -- Out of the silence: the power of language -- Desire and illusion: analyzing advertising -- Web sight : critical thinking and the internet -- Voices and visions : the media -- Clearing the path : legal reasoning.

This paper presents an analysis of commonly held views about critical thinking and how they relate to learning and teaching at the college level. It focuses on assumptions often held by researchers, such as those expressed in the three studies included in this issue, and considers as well the conclusions raised by these studies when addressing needs of those with disabilities. The theory of mediated learning experience offers a uniquely effective way to further critical thinking skills. The paper compares learner-centered vs. content-centered instructional design.

Introduction: thinking about globalization -- Systemic thinking: Immanuel Wallerstein -- Conceptual thinking: Anthony Giddens -- Sociological thinking: Manuel Castells -- Transformational thinking: David Held and Anthony McGrew -- Sceptical thinking: Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson -- Spatial thinking: Peter Dicken and Saskia Sassen -- Positive thinking: Thomas Friedman and Martin Wolf -- Reformist thinking: Joseph Stiglitz -- Radical thinking: Naomi Klein, George Monbiot and Subcommandante Marcos -- Revolutinary thinking: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri -- Cultural thinking: Arjun Appadurai -- Conclusion: rethinking globalization again.

Over the past three decades or so, the teaching of critical thinking as an essential part of general education has exerted a significant influence on contemporary post secondary education. Critical thinking includes as a central part traditional logic but goes beyond it both in scope and in the conception of what the evaluation of arguments involves, or, to put it in another way, in the very conception of what constitutes the ability to reason well. Indeed one of the notable trends that characterize recent developments in informal logic and critical thinking has been ‘a move toward a broad conception of argumentation which extends the analysis of argumentation beyond the analysis of premises and conclusions’ (Groarke 2002: section 1). An important sign of this trend is the increasing number of scholarly journals in the field of informal logic and theory of argumentation — e.g.

In this paper, we study the manifestations of what we call “dialogical critical thinking” in elementary school pupils when they are engaged in philosophical exchanges among peers: What are thecharacteristics of dialogical critical thinking? How does it develop in youngsters? Our research was conducted during an entire school year, with eight groups of pupils from three different cultural contexts: Australia, Mexico and Quebec. Our findings were constructed in an inductive manner, inspired by qualitative analysis as defined by Glaser and Strauss (1967). From our analysis, a grid was developed, illustrating the process by which dialogical critical thinking developed among the pupils involved in our research. This process is manifested via four modes of thinking (logical, creative, responsible and meta-cognitive), which become increasingly complex according to three epistemological perspectives (egocentricity, relativism and inter-subjectivity oriented toward meaning).

This text uses the educational objectives of Benjamin Bloom as six steps to critical thinking (namely: knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation). The book starts with the absolute basics (for example, how to find the topic, issue, and thesis) vs. the usual "explaining and evaluating arguments" and fine distinctions that easily can lose students.

This is a paper on George Rey’s views of conceptual analysis (as presented in two version of his paper on philosophical analysis, the second bearing a telling title “Philosophical Analysis as Cognitive Psychology: Thinking About Nothing»), and on his views on a priori. Let me fist mention that I am very happy to comment on these views, and to discuss it with Georges in a conference.[i] I have personally learned a lot from him; in particular, his computationalist view of a priori knowledge has influenced a lot my own thinking on the subject.

Can visual thinking be a means of discovery in elementary analysis, as well as a means of illustration and a stimulus to discovery? The answer to the corresponding question for geometry and arithmetic seems to be ‘yes’ (Giaquinto [1992], [1993]), and so a positive answer might be expected for elementary analysis too. But I argue here that only in a severely restricted range of cases can visual thinking be a means of discovery in analysis. Examination of persuasive visual routes to two simple theorems (Rolle, Bolzano) shows that they are not ways of discovering the theorems; the type of visual thinking involved can never be used to discover analytic theorems of a certain generality. The hypothesis that visual thinking is never a means of discovering the existence or nature of the limit of some infinite process is considered, and a likely counter-example is set out. It is still possible that restricted theorems can be discovered visually: an example from Littlewood is examined in detail and not found wanting. Even when visual thinking is not a means of discovery it can provide the idea for a proof in a direct way; an example is presented (Intermediate Value Theorem). In conclusion: it may be possible to discover theorems in elementary real analysis by visual means, but only theorems of a restricted kind; however, visual thinking in analysis can be very useful in other ways.