Being and betterness

Utilitas 22 (3):285-302 (2010)
In this article I discuss the question of whether a person’s existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person’s existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those provided by Holtug and Roberts.
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820810000208
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References found in this work BETA
F. Feldman (2005). Basic Intrinsic Value. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Philosophical Studies. Springer 379--400.

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Citations of this work BETA
Toby Handfield (2011). Absent Desires. Utilitas 23 (04):402-427.

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