Boole and mill: differing perspectives on logical psychologism

History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):19-36 (1980)
Abstract
Logical psychologism is the position that logic is a special branch of psychology, that logical laws are descriptíons of experience to be arrived at through observation, and are a posteriori.The accepted arguments against logical psychologism are effective only when directed against this extreme version. However, the clauses in the above characterization are independent and ambiguous, and may be considered separately. This separation permits a reconsideration of less extreme attempts to tie logic to psychology, such as those defended by Mill and Boole. It also provides the basis for a reexamination of the relationship between logic and psychology, and raises the possibility of a deeper investigation into the nature of logic itself
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References found in this work BETA
Marvin Farber (1962). The Foundation of Phenomenology. New York, Paine-Whitman Publishers.
Imre Lakatos (1978). Philosophical Papers. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Theodore Hailperin (1984). Boole's Abandoned Propositional Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (1):39-48.
Joan L. Richards (1986). Projective Geometry and Mathematical Progress in Mid-Victorian Britain. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (3):297-325.
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