David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 64 (2):139 - 168 (2006)
We examine the pros and cons of color realism, exposing some desiderata on a theory of color: the theory should render colors as scientifically legitimate and correctly individuated, and it should explain how we have veridical color experiences. We then show that these desiderata can by met by treating colors as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major as properties of the special sciences. According to our view, some of the major disputes in the literature about color -- anti-realism versus dispositionalism versus reductionism -- are not well-founded at this stage of scientific inquiry. Our account of color is designed to be of use in the sciences and as such is driven largely by considerations of what the various sciences need in order to proceed appropriately. We argue that a scientific theory of colors need not regard colors as anything more than high-level statistical constructs built out of correlations between color experiences and other phenomena
|Keywords||Color Irreducibility Phenomena Properties Realism Science|
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References found in this work BETA
David M. Armstrong (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell.
Edward W. Averill (1985). Color and the Anthropocentric Problem. Journal of Philosophy 82 (June):281-303.
RW Batterman (2000). Multiple Realizability and Universality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):115-145.
Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman (1989). Color as a Secondary Quality. Mind 98 (January):81-103.
Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman (1991). Physicalist Theories of Color. Philosophical Review 100 (January):67-106.
Citations of this work BETA
Wayne Wright (2010). Perception, Color, and Realism. Erkenntnis 73 (1):19 - 40.
Dimitria Electra Gatzia (2010). The Individual Variability Problem. Philosophia 38 (3):533-554.
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