Ceteris paribus clauses, closure clauses and falsifiability

Abstract
Summary The article argues thatceteris paribus clauses have to be separated from another type of clauses called closure clauses. The former are associated with laws and theories, the latter with test situations of a particular kind. It is also argued that closure clauses, but notceteris paribus clauses, make Popper's falsifiability principle untenable. In that way, it also resolves the quarrel between Popper and Lakatos aboutceteris paribus clauses and falsifiability by saying that both are partly wrong and partly right
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Citations of this work BETA
Manfred Tietzel (1986). Idealisierte Erklärungen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 17 (2):315-321.
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Christopher H. Eliot (2011). Hempel's Provisos and Ceteris Paribus Clauses. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):207-218.
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