Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?
Theoria 76 (3):197-206 (2010)
| Abstract | This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude | |||||||||
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J. H. Lesher (1981). Perceiving and Knowing in the Iliad and Odyssey. Phronesis 26 (1):2-24.
J. H. Lesher (1981). Perceiving and Knowing in the Iliad and Odyssey. Phronesis 26 (1):2-24.
Refeng Tang (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
E. A. R. (1965). Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing. The Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):163-163.
Michael David Roth (1970). Knowing. New York,Random House.
Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1).
Renaud Barbaras (2004). Affectivity and Movement: The Sense of Sensing in Erwin Straus. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):215-228.
Conor McHugh (2010). Self-Knowledge and the Kk Principle. Synthese 173 (3).
Robert J. Swartz (ed.) (1965). Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing. University of California Press.
Craig French (2012). Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge? Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
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