David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Economics and Philosophy 3 (2):215 (1987)
Radical and liberal theories of egalitarianism are distinguished, in large part, by the differing degrees to which they hold people responsible for their own well-being. The most liberal or individualistic theory calls for equality of opportunity. Once such “starting gate equality,” as Dworkin calls it, is guaranteed, then any final outcome is justified, provided certain rules, such as voluntary trading, are observed. At the other pole, the most radical egalitarianism calls for equality of welfare. In between these two extremes are egalitarian proposals that equalize more than conventional opportunities, yet less than full welfare. Sen speaks of equality of basic capabilities as a goal; implementing that requires more than starting gate equality, because some will require more resources than others to attain the same capabilities. Meeting basic needs is another objective. Equality of needs fulfillment is perhaps less radical than equality of basic capabilities and more radical than equality of opportunity. Rawls takes equality of primary goods as a benchmark; he distinguishes primary goods from welfare, but includes among them goods that are more complicated than conventional resources and opportunities, all of which are supposed inputs into any conception of welfare. One could imagine proposing an egalitarianism that equalized some quite measurable outcome across populations, such as infant mortality. That would be an outcome-equalizing theory where the rate of infant mortality is a proxy, presumably, for some more complicated maximand, such as the degree of wellbeing of a population
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
John Rawls (2009). A Theory of Justice. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press 133-135.
Peter van Inwagen (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Ronald Dworkin (1981). What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (3):185-246.
Ronald Dworkin (1981). What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4):283 - 345.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Christian Barry & Pablo Gilabert (2008). Does Global Egalitarianism Provide an Impractical and Unattractive Ideal of Justice? International Affairs 84 (5):1025-1039.
Ryan Long (2011). The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism. Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
Peter Vallentyne (2003). Brute Luck Equality and Desert. In Sabrina Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2005). Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-Neutralizing Aim. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):249-265.
Patrick Tomlin (2013). Choices Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism Over Time. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):393-407.
Daniel M. Hausman & Matt Sensat Waldren (2011). Egalitarianism Reconsidered. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):567-586.
Emma Rooksby (2009). How to Be a Responsible Slave: Managing the Use of Expert Information Systems. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 11 (1):81-90.
Jeremy Moss (2007). Against Fairness: Egalitarianism and Responsibility. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2-4):309-324.
Carl Knight (2006). The Metaphysical Case for Luck Egalitarianism. Social Theory and Practice 32 (2):173-189.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads10 ( #352,056 of 1,935,081 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #434,530 of 1,935,081 )
How can I increase my downloads?