David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphysica 13 (1):87-105 (2012)
The paper claims that Hume’s philosophy contains an ontology, i.e. an abstract exhaustive classification of what there is. It is argued that Hume believes in the existence of a mind-independent world, and that he has a classification of mind-related entities that contains four top genera: perception, faculty, principle and relation. His ontology is meant to be in conformity with his philosophy of language and epistemology, and vice versa. Therefore, crucial to Hume’s ontology of mind-independent entities is his notion of ‘supposing relative ideas’. Entities that are referred to by means of ordinary ideas can be truly classified, whereas entities that are referred to by means of relative ideas can only be hinted at. When Hume’s ontology is highlighted and systematised, his notion ‘the faculty of imagination’ becomes highly problematic. However, the exposition also makes it clear that Hume deserves the honorary title: the first cognitive scientist
|Keywords||David Hume Ontology Faculty of imagination Cognitive science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David Malet Armstrong (1978). A Theory of Universals. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume Ii. Cambridge University Press.
David Malet Armstrong (1978). Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I. Cambridge University Press.
Helen Beebee (2006). Hume on Causation. Routledge.
John Biro (2005). Jerry A. Fodor. Hume Variations. Hume Studies 31 (1):173.
Ralph W. Church (1941). Hume's Theory of Philosophical Relations. Philosophical Review 50 (4):353-367.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Alan Schwerin (2012). Hume's Labyrinth. Annales Philosophici 5:69 - 84.
David Landy (2006). Hume's Impression/Idea Distinction. Hume Studies 32 (1):119-139.
Walter Ott (2006). Hume on Meaning. Hume Studies 32 (2):233-252.
Jani Hakkarainen (2012). Hume's Scepticism and Realism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):283-309.
Paul Russell (1984). Hume's "Two Definitions" of Cause and the Ontology of "Double Existence". Hume Studies 10 (1):1-25.
Paul Russell (1984). Corrections Regarding "Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Cause and the Ontology of 'Double Existence'". Hume Studies 10 (2):165-166.
James Baillie (2000). Hume on Morality. Routledge.
Gregg Osborne (2005). Hume's Argument in Treatise 1.3.3. Hume Studies 31 (2):225-247.
David Owen (2009). Hume and the Mechanics of Mind : Impressions, Ideas, and Association. In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Anne Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (2003). Hume Variations. Oxford University Press.
Kevin Meeker (2006). Was Hume a Proper Functionalist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):120–136.
James M. Fielding & Dirk Marwede (2012). The Anatomy of the Image: Toward an Applied Onto-Psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):287-303.
Karolina Karmaza, Przemysław Nowakowski & Witold Wachowski (2011). Hume – cyber-Hume – Hume enaktywny. Wywiad z Tomem Froese. Avant 2 (1).
Crispin Wright (2001). Is Hume's Principle Analytic? In Bob Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), The Reason's Proper Study. Oxford University Press. 307-333.
Added to index2012-02-23
Total downloads17 ( #96,207 of 1,099,035 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #27,186 of 1,099,035 )
How can I increase my downloads?