How something can be said about telling more than we can know: On choice blindness and introspection
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):673-692 (2006)
The legacy of Nisbett and Wilson’s classic article, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes , is mixed. It is perhaps the most cited article in the recent history of consciousness studies, yet no empirical research program currently exists that continues the work presented in the article. To remedy this, we have introduced an experimental paradigm we call choice blindness [Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. . Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310, 116–119.]. In the choice blindness paradigm participants fail to notice mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they are presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. In this article, we use word-frequency and latent semantic analysis to investigate a corpus of introspective reports collected within the choice blindness paradigm. We contrast the introspective reasons given in non-manipulated vs. manipulated trials, but find very few differences between these two groups of reports
|Keywords||*Consciousness States *Introspection Choice Behavior|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache (2001). Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework. Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson (1977). Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes. Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikstrom & Andreas Olsson (2005). Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task. Science 310:116-119.
Sam S. Rakover (1983). Hypothesizing From Introspections: A Model for the Role of Mental Entities in Psychological Explanation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 13 (2):211–230.
A. Goldman (2004). Epistemology and the Evidential Status of Introspective Reports I. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):1-16.
Citations of this work BETA
Claire Petitmengin, Anne Remillieux, Béatrice Cahour & Shirley Carter-Thomas (2013). A Gap in Nisbett and Wilson's Findings? A First-Person Access to Our Cognitive Processes. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):654-669.
John M. Doris (2009). Skepticism About Persons. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.
Markus E. Schlosser (2013). Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
T. Parent (forthcoming). The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
L. Hall, P. Johansson, B. Tärning, S. Sikström & T. Deutgen (2010). Magic at the Marketplace: Choice Blindness for the Taste of Jam and the Smell of Tea. Cognition 117 (1):54-61.
Similar books and articles
William E. Seager (2002). Emotional Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):666-687.
Timothy D. Wilson (2003). Knowing When to Ask: Introspection and the Adaptive Unconscious. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9):131-140.
Christopher D. Frith & Hakwan C. Lau (2006). The Problem of Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):761-764.
Uljana Feest (2012). Introspection as a Method and Introspection as a Feature of Consciousness. Inquiry 55 (1):1 - 16.
Denis G. Arnold (1997). Introspection and its Objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94.
Jonathan W. Schooler (2004). Experience, Meta-Consciousness, and the Paradox of Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7):17-39.
Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) (2012). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
James Moore & Patrick Haggard (2006). Commentary on How Something Can Be Said About Telling More Than We Can Know: On Choice Blindness and Introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):693-696.
Lars Hall, Petter Johansson, Sverker Sikström, Betty Tärning & Andreas Lind (2006). Reply to Commentary by Moore and Haggard. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):697-699.
Morten Overgaard (2006). Introspection in Science. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):629-633.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #83,639 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #289,836 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?