Incarnate mind

Minds and Machines 5 (4):533-45 (1995)
  We are beings of the flesh. Our sensorimotor motor experience is the basis for the structure of our higher cognitive functions of conceptual cognition and reasoning. Consequently, our subjectivity is intimately tied up with the nature of our embodied experience. This runs directly counter to views of self-identity dominant in contemporary cognitive science. I give an account of how we ought to understand ourselves as incarnates, and how this would change our view of meaning, knowledge, reason, and subjectivity
Keywords Cognitive Science  Identity  Incarnation  Mind  Science  Self
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DOI 10.1007/BF00974984
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